Showing posts with label Peter Goss. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Peter Goss. Show all posts

Monday, January 4, 2016

Agenda Setting: The State-Centric Approach (Creation of the Department of Homeland Security)


(United States Congress, Photo by Susan Sterner. Wikimedia Commons)

            Prominent leaders in the US Congress have demanded explanations from President George W. Bush why the federal government failed to detect, monitor, and negate the terrorist attacks. The most vocal critic on this issue was New York Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (D) when she told the reporters on May 16, 2002, that “the public demands answers immediately . . . And the people of New York deserve those answers more than anyone.”

            The Director of the CIA and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were not spared from the blame-game either. In the midst of this political turmoil, the people demanded accountability. There was a public outcry for the resignations of DCI George Tenet and Director Robert Mueller. The actions and inactions of their organizations were reflective of the way they led and managed the CIA and the FBI before the 9/11 attacks. The public clamor for an explanation of what caused the massive intelligence and security failure has not only reverberated in the streets of America but also rang in the halls of US Congress.

            Rep. Peter Goss (R), Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, himself a former CIA Intelligence Officer, said that “over the years, success in the FBI meant ‘to go out and apprehend criminals’ prosecute them and ‘get them off the streets’ . . . that approach is still needed but with terrorism, there is a new element of integrating overseas intelligence to prevent acts inside the United States.” Likewise, Rep. Jane Harman (D), a ranking member of the intelligence committee, said that “the CIA, which by law operates overseas, and FBI, which operates within the United States, have to rethink their separate roles when it comes to dealing with terrorism. . . I still see a separate law enforcement and intelligence function, but if we stop at the border's edge, we may not be preventing terrorism.”

            The political activists and the Democratic Party leaders demanded that the Bush Administration be held accountable for the 9/11 tragedies as they happened under his watch. The Republicans countered that the terrorist plan was hatched during the time of the Clinton Administration, which had failed to detect and negate the attack including those that had happened before 9/11.

            On the span of just nine years—from February 26, 1993, in the first bombing of the World Trade Center, to its second attack on September 11, 2001—the United States had encountered ten major terrorist hits on US mainland and on US interests overseas. These attacks have resulted in the total death of 6101 people and injuries to 19,735. The blame game and political mudslinging from both parties have not produced any positive results to address the problems of terrorism. On the other hand, the crisis had spotlighted the years of dysfunctional relationship in the IC, which were then revisited by the members of the US Congress through the fact-finding commission.

            The US Congress noted the professional jealousies in the IC and this harmful rivalry among the members had hampered the coordination and sharing of information about the terrorists. Reports gathered by the media, the revelations of FBI whistleblowers, and the results of the congressional investigation have concluded that there were operational leads in the hands of the IC members, and had that information been shared with one another, it could have been used to negate the AQ network from carrying the attacks.

            Moreover, the congressional leaders had also seen the weakness of the FBI in analyzing and assessing the raw information coming from the field offices. For instance, Special Agent Kenneth Williams of Phoenix FBI Field Office wrote a five-page memorandum on July 10, 2001 about a possible attack on the United States. His report did not reach the key Bureau officials. Senator Richard J. Durbin (D), who attended the closed-door congressional hearing when Williams testified before the Judiciary Committee,  learned that the memorandum did not go up to the chain of command. Durbin commented that the report was “never treated seriously within the FBI, never circulated, never analyzed, nor referred to the CIA."

            The responsibility of securing the mainland from terrorist attack is the primary assignment of the FBI. However, the FBI had no strategic plan to address the rising danger posed by the Islamist terrorists that time. The Bureau came up with a draft assessment entitled “FBI Report on the Terrorist Threat to the United States and a Strategy for Prevention and Response” in September 2001. The lack of strategic planning on terrorism has clearly reflected in the Bureau’s organizational behavior towards terrorism.

            The FBI serves as the federal government’s lead agency in charge to respond, investigate, and prosecute terrorists. However, it will only pursue the terrorists after they struck, not while they are still in the planning stage. As an example, a request to conduct manhunt on AQ operative Khalid al-Mihdar in the United States was denied by the Bureau heads because the FBI Special Agents are criminal investigators and not intelligence operators. Al-Mihdar was one of the terrorists that crashed American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon building.

            The 9/11 tragedies created a groundswell in the US Congress to review the FBI’s role as the lead agency that oversee the efforts in counter-terrorism because its organizational culture and operational thrusts are not suitable for counter-terrorism. It took the lives of thousands of people for the federal government to finally admit that there is a need to create an organization that will focus mainly on countering the threats of terrorism in US mainland. Thus, after so much discussions and hesitations, the proposal to create a super organization that is distinct from the FBI and CIA has been proposed to the members of the US Congress by the Bush Administration. The US Congress, on the other hand, had its own version of a domestic agency, which was incorporated later on in the White House’s proposal.