Introduction: The Nation Under Siege (Creation of the Department of Homeland Security)



(World Trade Center. Photo courtesy of Wally Gobetz, Wikemedia Commons)


 

            The notion that the United States is invincible from a foreign-terrorist attack was proven wrong after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, which later referred to as the 9/11. The successful terrorist operations carried out in New York and Washington DC by the members of al-Qaeda (AQ) have revealed to the world that even a powerful country like the United States is not secured from a suicidal terrorist group.

            The results of the suicide attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon building not only claimed the lives of 5,350 Americans and foreign expatriates, but they also resulted in the injuries of 6,500 people. These figures do not include the lives of 44 passengers and the flight crew of United Airlines Flight 93 killed when they crashed in the outskirt of Shanksville, Pennsylvania while bravely wrestling control of the plane from the terrorists.

            The terrorists' operations on 9/11 have revealed the softer sides of the security and intelligence apparatus of the United States government. The much-heralded invincibility of the US Intelligence Community (IC), considered as the best in the world, was later on regarded by the public as an incompetent organization. The IC members' ineptitude raised serious concern about the capability to provide the policymakers with accurate and timely intelligence on future terrorist operations in the United States.

            There are several factors that can be considered why the IC failed to preempt the AQ plot. One of these was the lack of a strategic plan to counter the emerging threats of global terrorism coming from the ranks of the Islamist terrorists after the Cold War. The IC members, particularly the FBI and the CIA, have failed to adjust to the changing geopolitical landscape of the world after the collapse of the Berlin wall—which consequently united the two German countries—and of the break-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) into independent States.

            The political change has shifted the global alliances that even former Warsaw Pact members (i.e., communist states) became part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This transformation had left the United States with no traditional military enemies to engage with. The threat to United States' national security via conventional warfare or through missile strikes from the distant European shores has lessened.

            The lowering of guards created false security, which apparently affected the collection of intelligence data because of the pressure to disband the CIA in the aftermath of the downfall of communism in Europe. The Democratic Party leaders called for the abolition of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and to transfer its foreign intelligence activities to the US Department of State as well as the CIA’s paramilitary operations to the Pentagon.

            The demise of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries—considered as the “A” list nations in terms of threat to national security—has caused the United States’ foreign policy on security to shift to the “B” list nations (e.g., Iraq and North Korea)  and to the “C” list nations (e.g., Bosnia, Somalia). Accordingly, the immediate attention given to the “B” list nations is to preempt these countries to fill the void left by the “A” nations and to counter the proliferations of weapons of mass destruction. Security experts claimed that, because the focus of the IC resources in the past decade was shifted to the “B” list nations, the IC had never seen the emerging threats coming from the Islamic radical groups, particularly the MAK—the forerunner of AQ network, after the Soviet-Afghan war.

            There were estimated 40,000 displaced had-core mujahideens, who came from various Muslim countries around the world to fight in Afghanistan.  With no more war to win and no more battle to fight, these seasoned fighters went back to their respective countries and became leaders of terrorist groups in their localities. For example, the late Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, who founded the notorious Abu Sayaff Group in the Philippines, was a veteran of the Soviet-Afghan war. Others had surreptitiously relocated to the West and secretly formed cell groups in Germany, France, and Spain. These developments were not seen by the IC as a gathering threats to the security of United States until the 9/11 attacks happened.

            Before the 9/11, there were 14 organizations that comprised IC—six from the civilian sector and eight from the military sector. Its mandate came from the Executive Order 12333 (United States Intelligence Activities), which provides, among others, to “collect information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against, intelligence activities directed against the United States, international terrorist and international narcotics activities, and other hostile activities directed against the United States by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and their agents.”

            The US Intelligence Community members were as follows:

             Civilian Sector

            1. Central Intelligence Agency

            2. Federal Bureau of Investigation
            3. US State Department
            4. Treasury Department
            5. Energy Department
            6. Coast Guard

            Military Sector

            1. Defense Intelligence Agency

            2. National Security Agency
            3. National Reconnaissance Office
            4. National Imagery and Mapping Agency
            5. Army Intelligence
            6. Navy Intelligence
            7. Air Force Intelligence
            8. Marine Intelligence

Post Paris Attacks: Countering Terrorism from the Intelligence Production Side

(A Dynazoom, circa 1960s-1970s.  Used by the CIA intelligence analysts for viewing of satellite and aircraft films. Wikimedia Commons.)

            On July 10, 2001, FBI Special Agent Kenneth Williams of Arizona Field Office wrote a five-page memorandum about a possible attack on the United States by Middle Eastern students enrolled in flight schools in the country.  (Van Natta Jr. and Johnston 2002). 

            Williams reportedly came up to this conclusion after interviewing some Arab students who had expressed great animosity towards the United States. 
            Senator Richard J. Durbin (D),  after the closed-door congressional hearing where Williams testified before the Judiciary Committee,  was surprised when he learned that the memo did not go up to the Bureau's chain of command and  was “never treated seriously, never circulated, never analyzed, nor referred to the CIA.”  (Van Natta Jr. and Johnston 2002).
            The reason why the Phoenix Memo did not get its proper attention was due to the weak analytical capability of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to process raw intelligence report that time.  Director Mueller admitted this handicap when he said, “What did not happen with the memo from Phoenix points squarely at our analytical capacity.  Our analytical capability is not where it should be…” (Mueller 2002).  Unlike the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI on pre-9/11 era was a reactive agency being a law enforcement unit and not a proactive on its terrorism coverage like the CIA. 
            The FBI, by not having competent intelligence analysts devoted to counter-terrorism matters, had failed to thwart the terrorists’ attacks on the homeland.  This fiasco had triggered a major overhaul of the US Intelligence Community apparatus and most of the upgrade had been directed to the hiring and training of new pools of intelligence analysts. The necessity to train new recruits and develop others to become adept in their field are crucial to the success in the war on terror.  Since then, each USIC member had elevated its fight against terrorism to the next level by improving the capability of its personnel to produce critical analysis and provide timely intelligence to the end-users in the federal government. 
            Why are the intelligence analysts important in counter-terrorism operations?  The intelligence analysts—whether in the military units or civilian agencies—create a clear and big picture of the terrorist groups' intents and plans by piecing together the little information collected via overt sources and covert methods.  The analysts “sift through the giant haystack of information . . . to find the little needles that are really important.”  (Hess 2001). 
             Moreover, the intelligence analysts perform link analysis and timeline analysis to monitor the trends of terrorists activities/operations at home and overseas.  The similarities of data obtained from open source intelligence (e.g., newspapers, think-tank reports, speeches, the internet) and from covert sources (e.g., action agents, wiretaps, surveillance) would show patterns and trends, which could become a baseline in predicting future attacks.  The threat analysis helps the decision makers in the government, especially the President of the United States and the National Security Council, prepare a proactive national strategy and anti-terrorism policy to address the threats of radical Islamists here and abroad. Similarly, the threat analysis gives the top brass in the military and the heads of federal law enforcement units the opportunity to prepare tactical counter-measures to preempt the destabilization plans of the enemies.  
             What had happened in Paris on November 13^th was the best example of a government who had failed to act on the available intelligence. It was reported that the Iraqi government warned France of imminent attacks from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  Could we say that the info from the Iraqis was “never treated seriously, never circulated, never analyzed” just like the Phoenix Memo?
            The intelligence analysts should be aware of the local, national, and global threats vis-à-vis requirements of the policymakers to produce timely and actionable intelligence. To accomplish their tasks, the analysts must lay down the hypotheses that need to be confirmed and disproved—including the plausible hypothesis and deception hypothesis. Some hypotheses lack immediate support (i.e., intelligence gap), and this vacuum needs to be filled-in to get the full picture of a threat.  (Heuer 1999) 
             To predict future events, the intelligence analysts explore and evaluate the collected information through the process of assumptions and interpretations using their hypotheses as guides. And the hypothesis that has the highest probability or possibility of occurring is passed on to the decision makers for appropriate action. The analysts continue to monitor the hypothesis they chose even as new information comes in daily from the field. The fresh information collected from covert and overt sources may open new possibilities or probabilities.  As such, the analysts may change or modify their initial predictions or may suggest an acceleration of occurrence of such events to the end-users.  
            The capability of the intelligence analysts to draw hypotheses from raw information and come up with a critical interpretation that could predict possible or probable terrorists’ action is vital to the homeland security. With the recent threats from multi-national terrorists such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, the work of the intelligence analysts has never been so critical in the protection of the United States government interests and installations, personnel, and American citizens overseas.   sDg.